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Process Safety Management; also referred to as PSM is the application of 
management systems to the identification, understanding and control of process hazards 
to prevent process-related injuries and incidents. The major objective of process safety 
management (PSM) of highly hazardous chemicals is to prevent unwanted releases of 
hazardous chemicals especially into locations that could expose employees and others to 
serious hazards.  
Most of the company or plant only uses lagging indicators to measure their 
process safety performance and it has disadvantages since it indicates process safety 
performance after accidents occur. Thus, the effort to integrate both lagging and leading 
indicators had been discussed in this project. Based on the 14 elements of Process Safety 
Management (PSM), the most relevant Key Performance Indicators are selected and the 
metrics associated with them are identified.  
 The focus of this project will be on Process Safety Incident for lagging indicators 
and Process Hazard Analysis for leading indicators. The calculations for both indicators 
are based on the guidelines and literature reviews available from the expertise of the 
process safety field. The main calculations are based on the severity level and score. 
Thus, a modified severity level and score had been developed to measure the safety 
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1.1 Background of Study 
 “You can’t manage what you can’t measure” quoted by Dennis Hendershot [1] 
is very important quote in the development of process safety performance indicators. 
Process safety performance indicators are applied to monitor and improve the safety of 
process plants [2].   This indicators or also known as metrics are implemented to track 
safety performance, to compare or benchmark safety performance against other facilities 
performance and to set targets or goals for continuous improvement of safety 
performance.  
In most practice, process safety performance indicators are divided into two 
categories which are lagging and leading indicators. Lagging indicators can be 
considered as reactive monitoring since it measures the outcomes or effectiveness of 
actions taken. Meanwhile, leading indicators are considered as proactive monitoring 
since it measures preparedness to manage emergency situation.  
Process Safety Management (PSM) is the application of management systems to 
the identification, understanding and control of process hazards to prevent process-
related injuries and incidents. The phrase Process Safety Management System is the 
adopted from OSHA Standard 29CFR 1910.119 Process Safety Management of Highly 
Hazardous Chemicals in 1992 [3].  
Measuring injuries to people or lost work days are only one aspect of measuring 
safety performance and it is often considered to be part of occupational or personal 
safety measurement. However, the focus of process safety management is to prevent 
release of hazardous material or energy from the process equipment. An effective 
process safety management program requires a systematic approach to evaluate the 




 This project is called as Development of Key Performance Indicators (KPI) for 
Process Safety Management System. It is based on the most relevant elements that could 
be selected from the system to make an actionable change to something with defined 
cause and effect relationship.   
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Unexpected releases of toxic, reactive, or flammable liquids and gases in 
processes involving highly hazardous chemicals have been reported for many years. 
Incidents continue to occur in various industries that use highly hazardous chemicals 
which may be toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive, or may exhibit a combination of 
these properties. Regardless of the industry that uses these highly hazardous chemicals, 
there is a potential for an accidental release any time they are not properly controlled. 
This, in turn, creates the possibility of disaster. On July 17, 1990, OSHA published in 
the Federal Register (55 FR 29150) a proposed standard,—‖Process Safety 
Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals‖—containing requirements for the 
management of hazards associated with processes using highly hazardous chemicals to 
help assure safe and healthful workplaces. OSHA‘s proposed standard emphasized the 
management of hazards associated with highly hazardous chemicals and established a 
comprehensive management program that integrated technologies, procedures, and 
management practices [4].  
 
Process industries rely heavily on failure data to monitor performance, so 
improvements or changes are only determined after an accident has occurred. In other 
words, corrective actions can only be initiated after the occurrence of accidents or 
incidents. These after effect scenarios (lagging indicators) are too late and costly. To 
compensate the disadvantages of lagging indicators, this project will focus on how to 
use integrated both lagging and leading indicators to measure and improve the 
effectiveness of process safety performance system. The proposed safety performance 






The main objective of the project is to develop Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
to drive Process Safety improvement.  The other objectives are:  
1. To provide a measure of how well the barriers or hazard controls related to 
preventing process safety incidents are working. 
2. To develop safety performance indicators for specified PSM elements chosen.  
 
1.4 Scope of Study 
The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) will be developed based on 14 elements 
of Process Safety Management system. Specifically, this project will develop KPI for 
based on focused elements of PSM which are:  
1. Process Safety Incident  















2.1  Process Safety Management (PSM) 
2.1.1  Definitions 
Process Safety is a blend of engineering and management skills focused on 
preventing catastrophic accidents, particularly explosions, fires, and toxic releases, 
associated with the use of chemicals and petroleum products. 
Process Safety Management—also referred to as PSM—is the application of 
management systems to the identification, understanding and control of process hazards 
to prevent process-related injuries and incidents. The goal is to minimize process 
incident by evaluating the whole process. The phrase Process Safety Management came 
into widespread use after the adoption of OSHA Standard 29 CFR 1910.119 Process 
Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals in 1992 [3]. 
 
2.1.2 Process Safety Management (PSM) Elements  
There are 14 minimum elements [3] that the OSHA standard requires employers 
to do which are:  
1. Employee participation  
2. Process safety information  
3. Process hazard analysis  
4. Operating procedures  
5. Training  
6. Contractors  
7. Pre-start up safety review  
8. Mechanical integrity  
9. Hot work permit  
10. Management of change  
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11. Incident investigation  
12. Emergency planning and response  
13. Compliance audits  
14. Trade secrets  
Based on this project, the elements that will be discussed are:  
Table 1: PSM elements 
 
2.2 Process Safety Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)  
2.2.1 Definition 
Key Performance Indicators (KPI) are implemented to track safety performance 
and to set goals for continuous improvement of safety performance. The use of 
operating experience as a starting point to define indicators has been proposed [2]. 
The general criteria that all the indicators were required to meet were the following:  
 They should be objective and safety significant 
 They should be obtainable with the data available in the plant 
This project is done based on several guidelines on how to develop Key 
Performance Indicators for Process Safety Management System available. The examples 
of the guidelines are listed in the table below. 
 
PSM Elements Description 
Process Safety 
Incident 
Any releases of material and energy from a process unit and meets all the 
criteria such as; chemical or chemical process involvement, above minimum 
reporting threshold, location of incident and acute release.  
Process Hazard 
Analysis 
Specifies that process hazard analyses (PHA‘s) must be conducted as soon as 
possible for each covered process using compiled process safety in an order 





Table 2: Main literature reviews for Key Performance Indicators 





A step-by-step guide 
for chemical and 
major hazard 
industries to develop 
performance 
indicators to give 
improved assurance 
that major hazard 
risks are under 
control. 
 
Introduction to leading and lagging indicators. 
- Leading indicators: form of active monitoring 
focused on a few critical risk control systems to ensure 
their continued effectiveness. 
- Lagging indicators:  form of reactive monitoring 
requiring the reporting and investigation of specific 
incidents and events to discover weaknesses in that 
system. 
- Implementation of 'dual assurance‘: Leading and 
lagging indicators are set in a structured and systematic 
way for each critical risk control system within the 










assembled by the 




committee for a 
common set of 
company and 
industry leading and 
There are three types of metrics can be considered as 
measurements at different levels of the ―safety 
pyramid‖ illustrated by CCPS. The types and 
definitions of the metrics are:  
―Lagging‖ Metrics – a retrospective set of metrics that 
are based on incidents that meet the threshold of 
severity that should be reported as part of the industry-
wide process safety metric. 
―Leading‖ Metrics – a forward looking set of metrics 
which indicate the performance of the key work 





2.2.2 Categories of Safety Performance Indicators 
Key performance indicators or also known as metrics are implemented to track 
safety performance, to compare or benchmark safety performance against the 
performance of other facilities and to set goals for continuous improvement of safety 
performance. Generally, safety performance indicators can be classified into two 
categories: leading and lagging performance indicators.  Leading indicators is the form 
of active monitoring focused on a few critical risk control systems to ensure their 
continued effectiveness. It is a retrospective set of metrics that are based on incidents 
that meet the threshold of severity that should be reported as part of the industry-wide 
process safety metric. Meanwhile, lagging indicators is form of reactive monitoring 
requiring the reporting and investigation of specific incidents and events to discover 
weaknesses in that system [7]. It is a forward looking set of metrics which indicate the 
performance of the key work processes, operating discipline, or layers of protection that 
prevent incidents [8].  
 
lagging metrics. that prevent incidents. 
―Near Miss‖ and other internal Lagging Metrics – the 
description of less severe incidents, or unsafe 
conditions which activated one or more layers of 
protection. Although these events are actual events 
(i.e., a ―lagging‖ metric), they are generally considered 
to be a good indicator of conditions which could 










Figure 1: Two categories of Safety Performance Indicators [9] 
 
2.2.1.1 Reactive Monitoring: Use of Lagging Indicators 
Reactive monitoring of process safety includes the identification, reporting, and 
investigation of process-related injuries, incidents and property damage [10].Reactive 
monitoring allows an organization to identify and correct deficiencies in response to 
specific incidents or trends. Reactive monitoring uses lagging indicators to measure 
historical, after-the-fact performance [5]. These indicators show when the desired safety 
outcome has not been achieved and the safety control system has failed to prevent an 
accident.  
However, they may not provide sufficient information to guide actions and 
ensure the success of management activities. They may fail to reveal latent hazards and 
failures that have significant potentials to cause accidents since they suggest corrective 
actions only after the accident. . In addition, the outcome rates are may be too low to 
measure and takes much time and work loading to review the usefulness and reliability 






2.2.1.2 Active Monitoring: Leading Indicators 
Active monitoring evaluates the present state of a facility through the routine and 
systematic inspection and testing of work systems, premises, plant and equipment 
including rotating equipment, pressure vessels, piping, relief valves, and other safety-
related equipment [10]. 
Although leading performance indicators are effective in improving performance 
and may compensate for shortcomings of lagging performance indicators, they still have 
some potential pitfalls when the following situations happen.  The first is the effect of 
selecting irrelevant measurements which means targeting the wrong tasks through a lack 
of the understanding of the inputs that affect the outcomes. Secondly, leading 
performance indicators are deemed simply as a metric with actions being taken to get a 
good score rather than being used to guide actions that will correct weaknesses and 
improve the ultimate performance.  
 
2.2.1.3 Combination of lagging and leading indicators 
For avoiding the weakness and keeping the advantages of leading performance 
indicators, this project focuses on a combination of both categories of indicators. This 
combination may provide a systematic procedure to measure and evaluate the health and 
safety performance of organizations and to contribute to effective implementation.  
The characteristics of the combination of both categories of indicators are 
objective and easy to measure and collect, relevant to activities considered to be 
important for future performance and critical to the organization. They have to provide 
immediate and reliable indication of the level of the performance and maintain 
efficiency. Most of all, they must be understood and provide a clear indication of a 
means to improve performance.   
For this project, it will focus on elements under operational integrity category 
where it is intended to monitor parameters related to process and its operation. The 
elements that have been chosen for this category are Process Safety Incidents and 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA – HAZOP). These elements are monitored through a set 




2.3 Development of Lagging and Leading Metrics 
2.3.1 Definition 
―Lagging‖ Metrics – a retrospective set of metrics that are based on incidents that 
meet the threshold of severity that should be reported as part of the industry-wide 
process safety metric. 
 
―Leading‖ Metrics – a forward looking set of metrics which indicate the 
performance of the key work processes, operating discipline, or layers of protection that 
prevent incidents. 
 
―Near Miss‖ and other Internal Lagging Metrics – the description of less severe 
incidents (i.e., below the threshold for inclusion in the industry lagging metric), or 
unsafe conditions which activated one or more layers of protection. Although these 
events are actual events, they are generally considered to be a good indicator of 
conditions which could ultimately lead to a severe accident [6]. 
 
2.3.2 Lagging Metrics: Process Safety Incident (PSI) 
The common industry-wide lagging metrics [6] based on Center for Chemical 
Process Safety (CCPS) pamphlets are:  
1. Count of Process Safety Incidents (PSI) — Any release of material or energy  
from a process unit resulting in injury, fire or explosion or chemical release from 
primary containment that exceed the defined threshold indicating significant 
process safety impact. 
2.  Process Safety Incident Rate (PSR) — a normalization of the PSI based on total 
plant work hours 
3. Process Safety Incident Severity Rate (PSISR) — a weighting of the PSR based 




From a process safety perspective, the three defined metrics are excellent choices 
for common lagging indicators. Moreover, the categories and severity levels are 
consistent with severity criteria commonly used in the industry for process hazard 
analysis. The usage of these metrics is appropriate and adequate for tracking process 
safety impacts. It is feasible to apply these metrics in this project since the definitions 
are quite clear. 
 
Process Safety Incident: For reporting purposes, a Process Safety Incident (PSI) is an 
actual unplanned or uncontrolled Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC) that either [11] 
had an effect on people, property, or the environment; or was above a threshold amount 
in PSI reporting criteria.  
 
An incident is reported as process safety incident if it meets all the following criteria: 
1. Chemical or chemical process involvement 
 A chemical or chemical process must have been directly involved in the 
damage caused. The term ―process‖ is used broadly to include the equipment 
and technology needed for petrochemical production, including reactors, 
tanks, piping, boilers, cooling towers, refrigeration systems, etc.  
 To identify incidents that are related to process safety, as distinguished from 
personnel safety incidents that are not process – related 
 
2. Location 
 An employee injury occurs at a process location which is directly chemical 
process-related.  
 Incident occurs in production, distribution, storage, utilities or pilot plants of 
a facility includes tank farms, ancillary support areas and distribution piping 






3. Above minimum reporting threshold 
 An employee, contractor or subcontractor Fatality and/or Days Away from 
Work, or a third-party fatality or injury/illness that results in a hospital 
admission 
 A Fire or Explosion that causes $25,000 or more of direct cost, or 
 An acute release of flammable, combustible, or toxic chemicals from the 
primary containment (i.e., vessel or pipe) greater than chemical release 
threshold quantities described on the Table 3.  
 
 
Table 3: Material Hazard Classification 
 
For the purposes of applying these threshold values for ―Flammable 
Gases/Vapors‖, ―Flammable Liquids‖, and ―Combustible Liquids‖, the definitions 
commonly used are either within the petroleum refining industry (based upon National 
Fire Protection Association, NPFA-30, definitions), the UN Dangerous Goods (Class 2, 
Div. 2.1 and Class 3), or the Harmonized System of Classification and Labeling of 
Chemicals (GHS), Chapters 2.2 and 2.6. These different methods classify materials in a 
Material Hazard Classification as Defined by the 
United Nations Dangerous Goods definition  
PSI threshold quantity 
 
All TIH Class A materials 5kg (11 lb.) 
All TIH Class B Materials 25 kg. (55 lbs.) 
All TIH Class C Materials 100 kg. (220 lbs.) 
All TIH Class D Materials 200 kg. (440 lbs.) 
All ―Packing Group I‖ materials & ―Flammable 
Gases/Vapors‖ 
500 kg (1100 lbs.) 
All ―Packing Group II‖ materials & ―Flammable 
Liquids‖ 
1000 kg (2200 lbs.) 
All ―Packing Group III‖ materials & ―Combustible 
Liquids‖ 
2000kg (4400 lbs.) 
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similar manner; therefore, most flammable materials will fall into the same category 
regardless of the definitions used [6]. 
 
2.3.3 Leading Metrics: Process Hazard Analysis – HAZOP  
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) (or, Process Hazard Evaluation) is a set of 
organized and systematic assessments of the potential hazards associated with an 
industrial process. A PHA provides information intended to assist managers and 
employees in making decisions for improving safety and reducing the consequences of 
unwanted or unplanned releases of hazardous chemicals. A PHA is directed toward 
analyzing potential causes and consequences of fires, explosions, releases of toxic or 
flammable chemicals and major spills of hazardous chemicals, and it focuses on 
equipment, instrumentation, utilities, human actions, and external factors that might 
impact the process [12]. 
The process hazard analysis is a thorough, orderly, systematic approach for 
identifying, evaluating, and controlling the hazards of processes involving highly 
hazardous chemicals. The employer must perform an initial process hazard analysis 
(hazard evaluation) on all processes covered by this standard. The process hazard 
analysis methodology selected must be appropriate to the complexity of the process and 
must identify, evaluate, and control the hazards involved in the process [13]. 
The selected PHA methodology to be done in this project is Hazard and 
Operability Study (HAZOP).A hazard and operability study (HAZOP) is a structured 
and systematic examination of a planned or existing process or operation in order to 
identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or 
prevent efficient operation. The HAZOP Study is an opportunity to correct these before 
such changes become too expensive, or impossible to accomplish [14].  
The key feature is to select appropriate parameters which apply to the design 
intention. These are general words such as Flow, Temperature, Pressure, and 
Composition. In the above example, it can be seen that variations in these parameters 
23 
 
could constitute Deviations from the design Intention. In order to identify Deviations, 
the Study Leader applies (systematically, in order) a set of Guide Words to each 
parameter for each section of the process. The current standard Guide Words are as 
follows: 
 
Table 4: HAZOP Guide Words [15] 
Guide Word Meaning 
NO OR NOT Complete negation of the design intent 
MORE Quantitative increase 
LESS Quantitative decrease 
AS WELL AS Qualitative modification/increase 
PART OF Qualitative modification/decrease 
REVERSE Logical opposite of the design intent 
OTHER THAN Complete substitution 
EARLY Relative to the clock time 
LATE Relative to the clock time 
BEFORE Relating to order or sequence 
AFTER Relating to order or sequence 
 
 
2.4 Existing Approaches 
As per literature review and report by Chakraborty et al. [15], the status of safety 
performance indicators can be summarized as follows: 
 There is no unified approach concerning terminology and definition of 
‗performance indicators,‖ ―safety indicators,‖ and ―safety performance 
indicators.‖ 
 There is no fixed suggested number of indicators. 
 There is no calibration of safety performance indicators to give quantitative 
measure of plant safety.  
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 Evaluation of safety performance indicators is based on threshold values derived 
from past experience.  
 There is no accepted approach to detect early signs of deterioration of safety, 
further relationship among different elements/parameters of safety need to be 
better understood and established.  
In recent years, many efforts have been made to measure process safety. 
Indicators with a wide scope are relatively recent. 
 
Table 5: Development of Process Safety Indicators 
Developers/ Organizations involved Description 
The Center for Chemical Process Safety 
(CCPS) [6] 
Defined process safety incident and proposed a 
draft metric to measure process safety 
UK Health and Safety Executive [5] Published a guide for development of leading and 
lagging process safety metrics 
OECD [16] Proposed guidance for the definition of safety 
performance indicators related to accident 
prevention, alert and emergency response 
API [ 12] Provide consistent lagging indicators and use to set 
performance targets, drive continuous improvement 
and permit benchmarking.  
SCSB [17] Investigation reports on BP Texas refinery accident 
has recommended that BP develop both leading and 
lagging process safety metrics as a tool for more 
effectively managing process safety. 
 
However, most of these efforts are missing the coherence, quantification, 
audibility and logical integration of leading and lagging indicators. In subsequent 
section of this report, a simpler approach based on severity rate and risk matrix is 
presented to apply process safety performance indicators. This approach is built upon 
the guidelines from the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) with the 





2.5 Combination of Lagging and Leading Process Safety Performance Indicators 
It is commonly believed that a good occupational safety performance record 
indicates good safety management, including process safety. However, as noted in BP 
Texas Refinery accident investigation, it is possible to have a good occupational safety 
record and still have a high level of process safety incidents (releases of hazardous 
materials) which do not cause injuries [18]. Process safety incidents are always 
neglected to be indicate since it is rare and only noticed when events of catastrophic 
occurs. This is indeed true since major process safety incidents happened as a result of 
degradation safety performance which often goes unnoticed until it is too late since the 
events had occurred. Thus, a proficient and suitable system to measure process safety 
performance is required and the system must contain lagging and leading performance 
indicators for process safety.  
 
Lagging indicators are the events that may and may not cause harm to personnel 
or property and it signify how well the process safety system is performing. 
Management can set goals for improvement using lagging indicators to determine where 
resources should be allocated to most effectively meet those goals and to determine 
which plants or units have the highest process safety incident rates. Meanwhile, leading 
indicators are measures of process or inputs essential to deliver the desired safety 
outcomes.  By monitoring leading indicators, it shows the current state of the process 
safety and potential of future incidents. The subsequent chapter of this report will 













3.1 Data Acquisition 
          Accurate data must be gathered in order to successfully developed Key 
Performance Indicators for Process Safety Management System as required for the 
project. The gathered data are obtained from the research carried out and also the 
communication between the author and the company/plant. 
 
3.2 Approach Selection and Evaluation 
          To develop Process Safety Indicators, it starts with the identification of potential 
failure scenarios and corresponding control measures that are in place to control the 
associated risks. Lagging indicators will denote the success of the risk control measures 
and number of events. Meanwhile, leading indicators monitor the importance of risk 
control measure and their successful operation. In this project, the combination of 
leading and lagging indicators are evaluated against an acceptance criterion and will be 
used for decision making. For this project, the selected elements from Process Safety 
Management to be evaluated are Process Safety Incident and Process Hazard Analysis. 
Both of these elements will be evaluated based on indicators developed by the author 
and the result will be compared to the existed approach using by the company/plant.  
 
3.3 Case Study 
           This project is done with the help of one of the fertilizer plant located in 
Malaysia.  From the data obtained, frequency of event (number of events in unit time) 
and severity of the event are the two characteristics monitored for each lagging 
parameters. Meanwhile, percentage of success (likelihood of success) and the 
importance of the success are the two characteristics monitored for each leading 
indicator parameter. However, not all data can be obtained from the company/plant due 
to confidentiality matters. Thus, several estimation of data had been done as part of the 
project.   
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NO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Selection of Project Topic 
2
3 Literature Reviews
4 Project Work 
5 Seminar 1 
6 Submission of Progress Report
7 Project Work  continues
















ii) Continue research work
DETAILS / WEEK
Title : Development of Key Performance 
Indicators for Process Safety Management 
System
Research work of : 
i) PSM elements, law and regulations
ii) indicators : lagging and leading metrics
i) Study of KPI development process
Submission of FYP project title proposal
3.4 Project Milestone 
Figure 2: Gantt chart for Final Year Project I 
 
  Detail/Week 1 2 3 4 5 6   7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 














                
2 Obtain and study case study                             
3 Submission of Progress Report 1          √                   
4 
Identify suitable information to be 
used             
  
              
5 Start to develop indicators                             
6 Submission of Progress Report 2               √              
7 Seminar                             
8 Poster Exhibition                   √         
9 
Submission of Dissertation      (Soft 
Bound)             
  
        √     
10 Oral Presentation                         √   
11 
Submission of Dissertation      (Hard 
Bound)             
  
            √ 
 






Calculate Process Safety Total 
Incident Rate (PSTIR) 
Total count of employees and 
contractors work hours 
 
Identify severity level of 
incident (based on Appendix A) 
Obtain case study 
Yes 
Does not meet criteria for 






Total count of Reportable 
Process Safety Incident 
Yes 
 
































Sum of the scores of incident 
Divide by the same man-hours 
unit as PSTIR 
Calculate Process Safety 
















Figure 4: Determining Process Safety Total Incident Rate (PSTIR) and Process Safety 









Manhours = Number of employees x Number of workdays x Work hours per day 
 
For lagging parameters, the metrics can be estimated by using equations below [6]:  
Equation 2  
Process Safety Total Incident Rate (PSTIR) 
=  Total count of all process safety incidents x 200 000               
        Total employee and contractor work hours 
* Include both employee and contractor man hours 
 
Equation 3 
Process Safety Incident Severity Rate (PSISR) 
=  Total severity score for all process safety incidents x 200 000   
    Total employee and contractor work hours 
* Assign score based on severity level 
 Both incident rates are based on cases per 100 worker years 
 A worker year is assumed to contain 2000 hours (50 work weeks/year x 40 
hours/week) 
Thus, incident rate is based on 200000 hours (100 worker years x 2000 hours) of worker 






Total Recordable Cases Rate (TRR) 
=             Number of recordable cases x 200 000               
        Total employee and contractor work hours 
* Include both employee and contractor man hours 
 
Equation 5 
Lost Workdays Cases Rate (LWCR) 
=         Number of Lost Time Accident Cases x 200 000   
         Total employee and contractor work hours 
 
Total employee, contractor and subcontractor work hours:  
 Total hours worked for refining, petrochemical, or chemical manufacturing 
facilities. 
 Using the same definitions that would be applicable for the OSHA 
injury/illness formula. 
 Man-hours associated with major constructions project or corporate 









Gather data from HAZOP study 
Identify hazard 
Identify level of severity (Table 
6) 
Identify range of likelihood 
frequency (Table 7) 
Identify risk class (Table 8) 




























Figure 5: Determining performance level for leading indicators 
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For leading parameters, the metrics can be estimated by using Equation 3. 




Assigned based  
on Appendix A 
E 1 Minor  
D 2 Not Serious 
C 3 Serious 
B 4 Very Serious 
A 5 Catastrophic 
 
Table 7: Likelihood Table 
Likelihood Description of probability 
1  Extremely unlikely  
2  Unlikely  
3  Possible  
4 Somewhat Likely  
5 Very Likely  
 







5 Class C Class B Class A Class A Class A 
4 Class C Class C Class B Class B Class A 
3 Class D Class C Class C Class B Class B 
2 Class E Class D Class D Class C Class B 
1 Class E Class E Class D Class D Class C 
 





Table 9: Risk Class Including Assigned Score based on Severity 






Risk intolerable - needs to be mitigated within 2 weeks to at least a Class 
C, if that cannot be accomplished, process needs to be shutdown 
0.27 
Class B 
Risk undesirable - needs to be mitigated within 6 months to at least a 
Class C 
0.09 
Class C Risk tolerable with controls (engineering and administrative) 0.03 
Class D Risk acceptable - no further action required 0.01 
Class E Risk neglectable 0 
 
Equation 3 
    Leading index =    
Count  of  Risk  Class  x Sev erity  Score
100
    
    
 
3.7 Integration of lagging and leading indicators 
Both lagging and leading indicators will be mapped on an acceptance scale 
where the target to be achieved is equal to. The values from 0 to 0.1 are characterized as 
green (acceptable - no concern), 0.1 to 0.3 are characterized as blue (acceptable – 
caution) and the value of 0.3 to 0.7 is characterized as yellow (requires attention). 
Meanwhile, the value of 0.7 to 1.0 is characterized as red (concern – requires immediate 
attention). Figure 6 represents the scale where it is used for both leading and lagging 
indicators. This scale is designed consistently parallel with company‘s risk matrix. 
0 to 0.1 (green) Acceptable (no concern) 
0.1 to 0.3 (blue) Acceptable (caution) 
0.3 to 0.7 (yellow) Requires attention 
0.7 to 1.0  (red) Concern (requires immediate attention)  
  




RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Data Acquisition 
 
An informal interview and email with person in charge for the safety department 
in one of the fertilizer plants in Malaysia had been done to obtain data required for this 
project. The input data for both indicators discussed are not all available in the required 
format. Some of the data are obtained from the refinery plant and some of the data are 
estimated based on typical refinery plant. The data presented also has been revised to 
preserve company confidentiality. The collected information was processed to validate 
the safety performance indicators that had been proposed for this project. 
 
4.2 Lagging Indicators 
4.2.1 Recordable Process Safety Incident 
The table developed (Appendix B) was filled to record any incident happens in 
the plant. From the recordable incident, the total number of recordable process safety 
incident and the severity score for the incident can be identified. As shown, the 
recordable incidents in the plant occurred in year 2003, 2005 and 2010. From all of the 
incidents occurred, the criteria for the incidents to be counted as process safety incidents 


































or equal to  
$25000 of 
direct 
cost to the 
company 



























One of the 
employees fell 
off the ladder in 
the plant and had 






















around the area 
vomiting and 4 
students are 
warded. Nobody 
inside this plant 




was directing to 














The results from the evaluation based on the Table 10 shows that not all of the 
incidents are meeting the criteria for process safety incidents. One of the criteria for any 
incidents to be considered as process safety incidents is chemical/chemical process 
involvement during the incident. A chemical or chemical process must have been 
directly involved in the damage caused. Another criterion is the location where the 
incidents occurred. An employee injury must be occurs at a process location which is 
directly chemical process-related. The third criterion is the incidents to be above 
minimum reporting threshold. Thus, based on the table, only incidents occurred in year 
2003 and 2010 are meeting the criteria as recordable process safety incident.  
 
4.2.2 Process Safety Severity Score 
Based on the recordable incidents shows by Table 10, severity score is assigned 
to process safety incidents recorded. The assigned score is given based on the modified 
process safety incidents and severity categories (Appendix A). The original table is 
obtained from CCPS Guidelines [6] and the author had modified the ranking of severity 
level for the simple observation to assign process safety incident severity score. The 































Score Yes No Score 






One of the employee 
fell off the ladder 






NH3 release (source 
of release still under 
investigation) causing 
several students (11) 
around the area 
vomiting and 4 
students are warded. 
Nobody inside this 
plant are injured 
during the incident 
because the wind 
direction was 
directing to the north 
of the plant.  






4.2.3 Number of employees and calculation of manhours 
The current number of employees is given in Appendix C. It is also known that 
the plant operated for 24 hours per day and only will be shut down for maintenance 
purposes or severe incidents happen that required the plant to shut down. From the data 
obtained, calculation of manhours can be done by using Equation 1. For this project, 
assumptions that had been made to calculate the manhours are:  
 
 The workdays per month are taken as 30 days. 
 The number of workhours per day is assumed to be 24 hours.  
 
However, the assumptions above is only used to calculate Process Safety Total 
Incident Rate (PSTIR) and Process Safety Incident Severity Rate (PSISR) that have 
been proposed for lagging indicators in this project. To compare the proposed approach 
with the conventional approach to indicate the safety performance in the plant, 
calculations for Total Recordable Rate (TRR) and Lost Workdays Cases Rate (LWCR) 
are also done. The assumptions that have been used for this calculation are:  
 
 The workdays per month are taken as 22 days since it excluding weekend.  
 The number of workhours per day is assumed to be 8 hours.  
 
4.2.4 Total Recordable Rate (TRR) and Lost Workdays Cases Rate 
(LWCR) 
 
Based on the data obtained, the calculations of Total Recordable Cases Rate 
(TRR) can be calculated by using Equation 4. For year 2002/2003, the TRR can be 















Total Recordable Cases Rate (TRR)
Total Recordable Cases Rate (TRR) 
=             Number of recordable cases x 200 000               
        Total employee and contractor work hours 
  = (1 x 200000) / 6800000 
  = 0.029 
The rest of calculations are tabulated in Appendix C. The result for the 
calculation is shown by Figure 7 below:  
 
Figure 7: TRR performance for the fertilizer plant 
 
Based on the graph, it shows that for the year 2002/2003 the TRR is 0.029. 
Meanwhile, for 2003, the TRR is increased due to lost time incident occurred. The TRR 
for this year is 0.154. For year 2004, the value of TRR is more or less equal to 2003 and 
increased again due to incident happened on 2005 where the value of TRR for 2004 and 
2005 are 0.000 and 0.028 respectively. Throughout 2005 to 2009, the value of TRR is 
not change significantly due to no recordable incidents occurred. However, the value of 
TRR is changed for 2010 since recordable incidents occurred in the plant.  
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The calculation of LWCR is done based on the total recordable cases recorded in 
the plant. From the cases, it can be identified that the incidents are either can or cannot 
be considered as Lost Workdays Cases. For calculation of Lost Work Days Cases 
Incident Rate (LWCR), Equation 5 can be used to calculate the rate. For year 
2002/2003, the LWCR can be calculated as below: 
 
Lost Workdays Cases Rate (LWCR) 
=         Number of Lost Time Accident Cases x 200 000   
         Total employee and contractor work hours 
  = (1 x 200000) / 6800000 
  = 0.029 
The rest of the calculations are in Appendix C and the results of the calculation are 




















Lost Workdays Cases Rate (LWCR)
 
Figure 8: LWCR performance for the fertilizer plant 
 
Based on the Figure 8 above, it shows that LWCR are proportional with TRR. 
For the year 2002 the LWCR is 0.029. Meanwhile for 2003, the LWCR is increased due 
to lost time incident occurred and the LWCR for the respective year is 0.077. For year 
2004, the value of LWCR is more or less equal to 2003 and increased again due to 
incident happened on 2005 where the value of LWCR for 2004 and 2005 are 0.000 and 
0.028 respectively. Throughout 2005 to 2009, the value of LWCR is not change 
significantly due to no recordable incidents occurred. However, the value of LWCR is 
changed for 2010 since recordable incidents occurred in the plant.  
 
4.2.5 Process Safety Total Incident Rate (PSTIR) and Process Safety 
Incident Severity Rate (PSISR) 
 
Based on the data from Table 11, the calculations of Process Safety Total 
Incident Rate (PSTIR) can be calculated by using Equation 2. For year 2002/2003, the 














Process Safety Total Incident Rate (PSTIR)
Process Safety Total Incident Rate (PSTIR) 
=  Total count of all process safety incidents x 200 000               
        Total employee and contractor work hours 
  = (1 x 200000) / 16041480 
  = 0.012 
 
The rest of the calculations are shown in Appendix D and the results from the 
calculation are shows in the Figure 9 below:  
Figure 9: PSTIR performance for the fertilizer plant 
 
Based on the graph above, it shows that PSTIR for both incidents occurred in 
2003 and 2010 are the same which is 0.012. This is because the total count for process 
safety incidents for both years is only one.  
Meanwhile, for PSISR, the values for both incidents are slightly different since 
the severity score for both incidents are different. The severity score is assigned based 
on Appendix A and can be shown as in the Table 11. The calculation for PSISR can be 













Process Safety Incident Severity Rate (PSISR) 
Process Safety Incident Severity Rate (PSISR) 
=  Total severity score for all process safety incidents x 200 000   
    Total employee and contractor work hours 
  = (9 x 200000) / 16041480 
  = 0.112 
 
Figure 10: PSISR performance for the fertilizer plant 
 
Based on the graph above, it shows that PSISR for 2003 and 2010 is 0.112.and 
0.141 respectively.  For the year 2004 until 2009, the PSISR has only little change for 
each year since no process safety incidents occurred during that those years. 
For PSISR and PSTIR, the calculations for manhours are based on 24 workhours 
per day and 7 days per week. This is because a typical plant is usually operating 24 
hours except when it has to be shut down for maintenance purposes. By using PSISR 
and PSTIR, the process safety incident can be monitored more adequately and this way 



















4.2.6 Comparison between Total Recordable Cases Rate (TRR), Lost Workdays 
Cases Rate (LWCR) and Process Safety Total Incident Rate (PSTIR), Process 
Safety Incident Severity Rate (PSISR).  
 
The comparison to evaluate safety performance by using conventional approach 




Figure 11: Comparison of TRR, LWCR and PSTIR, PSISR 
 
By observing the graph above, it can be seen that even though the rate for TRR 
and LWCR sometimes is lower than PSTIR and PSISR, the calculations are still 
inadequate to indicate process safety performance as discussed beforehand. Besides, the 
rates for PSTIR and PSISR are still under acceptable region (based on Figure 6).  
Generally, the calculation for TRR and LWCR is widely used by company/plant 
to indicate and evaluate their safety performance. However, the calculations for 
manhours are only based on 8 workhours per day and 5 days per week. Besides, total 
recordable accident includes in the calculation are based on personnel safety and not 
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focusing on process safety specifically. Thus, it is inadequate and less relevant to use 
TRR and LWCR to indicate process safety performance in the plant. 
 
4.3 Leading Indicators 
The index for leading indicators is developed based on the methodology 
elaborated in the previous chapter. Since it is proactive monitoring, the data obtained for 
this indicator are from HAZOP study which is only done at any time during the design 
and operation of the plant. HAZOP analyses are usually to be revised when considerable 
modifications, upgrades or re-design of existing facilities are carried out or if events like 
accidents, critical situations or near misses. Some of the extracted data obtained from the 
refinery plant are listed in the Appendix E. 
Based on the data, severity level for each HAZOP study is identified and the 
ranking is given based on Appendix A. Based on the Table 6, the alphabet A to E was 
obtained from company‘s raw data which is used to identify the severity of hazard 
identified. For this project, the ranking based on number 1 to 5 is given parallel to 
company‘s data. From the table, it can be seen that alphabet E represents minor severity 
and alphabet A represents major severity. Ranking 1 is given parallel to alphabet E 
which indicates minor severity. Meanwhile, ranking 5 is given parallel to alphabet A 
which indicates major severity.  
For the Table 7, the ranking and the description of the likelihood is obtained 
from the fertilizer plant. Number 1 in the likelihood column represents the extremely 
unlikely probability and number 5 in the column represents very likely probability for 
the process safety incidents to happen. Table 8 is developed accordingly to company‘s 
risk matrix. The table is developed based on Table 6 and Table 7. Based on the Risk 
Priority Matrix, risk class for hazard can be identified. Table 9 shows the risk class and 
the description for each class. Based on the risk class, the safety performance level can 






The calculation of leading index can be done by using Equation 3. Since the 
HAZOP study is applicable only during year 2004/2005, the calculation is only done for 
the particular year.   
 
Table 12: Leading Index 
Risk Class/Year 2004/2005 
Class A 0 
Class B 1.8 
Class C 0.96 
Class D 0.1 
Class E 0 
Total 0.572 
 
Based on the Table 12 above, it shows that the leading index for year 2004/2005 
is 0.572.  
 
 
4.4 Integration of Lagging and Leading Indicators 
 
 


















 Based on the graph above, it shows that operational integrity for lagging 
indicators are performing well compared to leading indicators. It means that there are 
issues in the cause of incidents, resulting in higher leading indicators rate. The results 
also show that there is an integrated relationship between the leading and lagging 
indicators. The relationship is simultaneously related since leading indicators monitor 
the preparedness of the safety measurement system meanwhile lagging indicators 
measure the safety measurement system after it fails. From the results, it is evident that 
process safety improves over time and symptom or causes of incidents required more 
attention to improve the safety performance of the plant.  
From the results obtained, it can be observed that there is a codependent 
relationship between the leading and lagging indicators. Since leading indicators are 
acted as proactive monitoring as it measures the preparedness, lagging indicators acted 
















CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
One of the incidents that had raised the attention needed for process safety is the 
BP Texas refinery accident which occurred on March 23
rd
, 2005. This because in the 
past, process safety was taken for granted and only considered at design level. Most of 
the process industry only relies on personnel safety indicators to measure a process 
safety performance. This kind of approach had been proven as inadequate and 
inappropriate to measure the performance of process safety in the company or plant. For 
process industries, symptoms, causes and incidents are monitored to characterize 
process safety.  
 The integrated lagging and leading indicators to measure safety performance 
discussed in this article is built upon the guidelines developed by Center of Chemical 
Process Safety (CCPS). The particular approach had been proposed to satisfy most of 
the characterization needs to indicate process safety performance. The set of parameters 
had been simplified to only two elements of Process Safety Management system and 
parameters are developed based on references from the experts‘ opinion available. For a 
detailed data collection, a system in Microsoft Excel software had been developed to 
ensure this approach can be easily adopted for process facility.  
 The proposed approach is used to evaluate safety performance of a refinery 
plant. The particular approach is able to model process safety performance. The 
relationship between symptom, cause and incident can be observed based on the results 
obtained for both lagging and leading indicators. The usage of both lagging and leading 
indicators are reliable and can be implemented to measure the effectiveness of safety 
performance. The proposed approach needs to be further revised and tested to improve 
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(1 point used in 
severity rate 
calculation for each of 
the attributes which 
apply to the incident)
2
(3 points used in 
severity rate 
calculation for each of 
the attributes which 
apply to the incident
3
(9 points used in 
severity rate 
calculation for each of 
the attributes which 
apply to the incident
4
(27 points used in 
severity rate 
calculation for each of 
the attributes which 
apply to the incident
On-site fatality-employee or 
contractors
associated with a process safety event; 
multiple lost time injuries or one or 
more
serious offsite injuries associated with 
a
process safety event
Resulting in $1MM to $10MM 
of direct cost
Chemical release with potential
for injury offsite or flammable 
release resulting in a vapor cloud
entering a building or potential
explosion site (congested/confined
area) with potential for damage
or casualties if ignited-see Note 
2C




and cost in between $1MM - 
$2.5MM. State government 
investigation and oversight of 
process
OR
Regional media coverage or brief 
national media coverageOff-site fatality or multiple on-site 
fatalities associated with a process 
safety event
Resulting in direct cost > $10MM Chemical release with potential for 
significant on-site or off-site 
injuries or fatalities - see Note 2D
National media coverage over 
multiple days
OR
Environmental remediation required 
and cost in excess of $2.5MM. 
Federal government investigation 
and  oversight of process
OR
Other significant community impact
Community environment impact
(Note 5)
Lost time injury to employee or 
contractors associated with a process 
safety event
Resulting in $25,000 to
$100,000 of direct cost
Resulting in $100,000 to 1MM 
direct cost
Chemical released within the
secondary containment or 
contained within the unit - see 
Note 2A
Does not meet or exceed  Level 1 
threshold
Short-term remediation to address  
acute environmental impact.
No long term cost or company 
oversight.
Examples would include spill 
cleanup, soil and vegetation 
removal. 
Chemical released outside of
containment but retained on
company property
OR
flammable release without 
potential vapor cloud explosives - 
see Note 2B
Minor off-site impact with 
precautionary shelter-in-place
OR
Enviromental remediation required 




Safety/Human Health (Note 5)
Does not meet or exceed  Level 1 
threshold
Injury requiring treatment beyond first 
aid to employee or contractors (or 
equivalent,Note 1) associated with a 
process safety incident.
(In USA, incidents meeting the 
definitions an OSHA recordable injury)
Fire or Explosion (including 
overpressure)
Does not meet or exceed  Level 1 
threshold
Potential chemical impact 
(Note 3)











NOTE 1: For personnel located or working in process manufacturing facilities 
 
NOTE 2: It is the intent that the ―Potential Chemical Impact‖ definitions shown 
in Table 2 provide such sufficient definition such that plant owners or users of 
this metric can select from the appropriate qualitative severity descriptors 
without a need for dispersion modeling or calculations. The user should use the 
same type of observation and judgment typically used to determine the 
appropriate emergency response actions to take when a chemical release occurs. 
The following nodes are being provided, as examples, to clarify the type of 
hazard intended with the four qualitative categories:   
A: AEGL-2/ERPG-2 concentrations (as available) or 50% of Lower 
Flammability Limits (LFL) does not extend beyond process boundary (operating 
unit) at grade or platform levels, or small flammable release not entering a 
potential explosion site (congested/confined are) due to limited amount of 
material released or location of release. 
B:  AEGL-2/ERPG-2 concentrations (as available) extend beyond unit boundary 
but do not extend beyond property boundary. Flammable vapors greater than 
50% of Lower Flammability Limits (LFL) at grade may extend beyond unit 
boundaries but did not entering a potential explosion site (congested/confined 
area); therefore, very little chance of resulting in a VCE.  
C: AEGL-2/ERPG-2 concentrations (as available) exceeded off-site OR 
flammable release resulting in a vapor cloud entering a building or potential 
explosion site (congested/confined area) with potential for VCE resulting in 
fewer than 5 casualties if ignited.  
D: AEGL-2/ERPG-2 concentrations (as available) exceeded off-site over the 
defined 10/30/60 minute time frame OR flammable release resulting in a vapor 
cloud entering a building or potential explosion site (congested/confined area) 





NOTE 3: The Potential Chemical Impact table reflects the recommended criteria. 
This approach should be used consistently and used for all releases.  
 
NOTE 4: The category labels can be modified to align with the severity order of 
other metrics. It is important to use the same severity point assignments shown.  
 
NOTE 5: The severity index calculations include a category for  
―Community/Environmental‖ impact and first aid level of Safety/Human Health 
impact which are not included in the PSI threshold criteria. However, the 
purpose of including both of these values is to achieve greater differentiation of 
severity points for incidents that result in any form of injury, community, or 































Appendix C: Total Recordable Rate (TRR) and Lost Workdays Cases Rate (LWCR) 
 
No of workers  2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 
Employees  1183 1183 1183 1183 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284 
Manhours 
         Employees 2500000 6800000 2600000 900000 7100000 4100000 10100000 18900000 22700000 
Number of Recordable Cases 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Total Recordable Cases Rate (TRR) 0.000 0.029 0.154 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 
Number of Lost Time Accident 
Cases 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Lost Workdays Incident Rate 
(LWCR) 0.000 0.029 0.077 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 
 
Appendix D: Process Safety Total Incident Rate (PSTIR) and Process Safety Incident Severity Rate (PSISR) 
 
No of workers  2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 
Employees  1183 1183 1183 1183 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284 
Manhours                   
Employees 10363080 16041480 7751016 17649824 22272224 17873280 29121120 36979200 12757824 
Reportable Process Safety Incident 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Process Safety Total Incident Rate (PSTIR) 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 
Severity Score for Reportable Process 
Safety Incident 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 
Process Safety Incident Severity Rate 
(PSISR) 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.141 
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Appendix E: One of the samples data for HAZOP study 
NODE DESCRIPTION DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES 
RISK MATRIX 
S P RR 









temperature at all stages 
lead to compressor 
damage and loss of Urea 
production 






Starved suction to CO2 
compressor K-31-01 
lead to compressor 
damage and loss of Urea 
production 







Less Urea production 
C 3 C3 
Anti-surged 
valve passing 










Starved suction to CO2 
compressor K-31-01 
lead to compressor 
damage and loss of Urea 
production 
A 2 A2 
No Flow 
No CO2 supply 
from battery 
limit 
Compressor surged lead 
to loss of production 




A 2 A2 
Loss of process 
Air to the 
system due to 
some fault 
condition on K-
12-01 result in 
loss of plant 
Corrosion occurs on the 
UR Synthesis Unit. 














Carbamate back flow to 
CO2 line lead to line 
blockage and compressor 
damage 






Compressor damage and 
loss of Urea production 












temperature at all stages 
lead to compressor 
damage and loss of Urea 
production 





CO2 phase change at 
suction 4th stage lead to 
compressor damage  
A 2 A2 
Low 
temperature of 
CO2 supply  
Condensation and carry 
over of water lead to 
compressor damage 
A 2 A2 




Compressor damage due 
to no flow lead to loss of 
Urea production 
A 2 A2 
Pipe, interstage cooler, 
separator and compressor 
casing burst lead to loss 
of Urea production 




battery limit  
Less Urea production C 3 C3 
High N/C ratio lead to 
high NH3 venting 
through HP vent and 
environmental effect 







31-01-01 closed  
Implode of separator V-
31-01-01 and piping of 
suction 1st stage K-31-01 





3103 lead to 
high level at 
Condensate 
Collector Pot 
(suction of 1st 
stage K-31-01) 
Possible ingress of liquid 
to the 1st stage of CO2 
compressor K-31-01 
resulting in machine 
damage. 
A 2 A2 
Isolation valve 





High level at separator 
lead to liquid carry- over 
that will damage K-31-01 
and cause loss of urea 
production 








A 2 A2 











        
No Level 
Drain valve 
(1") of V-31-04 
fully opened 
CO2 breakthrough lead to 
less CO2 flow and cause 
less of urea production 
C 3 C3 
Bypass drain 
valve of V-31-










C 3 C3 
Shut down 







High level at separator 
lead to liquid carry- over 
that will damage K-31-01 
and cause loss of urea 
production 

















maintenance plan lead to 
possibility of failure  









        
Contamination 
Benfield carry 
over due to 
excessive 
foaming at 
Benfield Unit  
Fouling of K-31-01 lead 
to compressor damage  





CO2 crystallization at 
suction 4th stage lead to 
compressor damage  





        
Loss of Phase  
No issue 
identified  




























to lube oil 
spillage in area 
of K-31-01 
Personnel injury       
33-PV-02 vent 
line height  
CO2 suffocation to 
working personnel nearby 
C 3 C3 
